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Clinton and North Korea: Past, Present and Future

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2000-03-03 23:58
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ENGAGING NORTH KOREA

"Clinton and North Korea: Past, Present and Future
By Joel Wit
March 1, 2000

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security issues in Northeast Asia, and an opportunity to
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http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0001A_Lee.html

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Please see "Nautilus Invites Your Responses," below, and send
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Copyright (c) 1998 Nautilus of America / The Nautilus Institute

--------------------

Contents of This Report:
I. Introduction
II. Essay by Joel Wit
1. The Past
2. The Present
3. The Near Future
4. Beyond the Clinton Administration
III. Nautilus Invites Your Responses

I. Introduction

The following article, "Clinton and North Korea: Past, Present and
Future," by Joel Wit, is the first of a series of articles on attempts to
engage the DPRK by the international community. Mr. Wit, a Guest Scholar
at the Brookings Institution, is a former US State Department official
who worked on DPRK issues from 1993-1999.

Wit reviews the history of US President Bill Clinton's engagement policy
of the DPRK. He argues that the Agreed Framework has been successful in
preventing the DPRK from developing a nuclear weapons arsenal, but has
not been fully implemented across the board. At present, the Perry
Report has restored some stability to US-DPRK relations. Further
progress in the near future could make it difficult for the next US
administration to make drastic changes in policy, although a Republican
president is likely to take a somewhat different approach toward the
DPRK.

II. Essay by Joel Wit


Five years ago, the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework was signed, ending
the confrontation between the two countries over North Korea's nuclear
weapons program and setting them on a path of engagement. Given the
previous four decades of hostility, that path has proven to be difficult.
Most recently, the growing threat posed by the North's development of
long-range missiles seems to have been halted by an agreement reached
between the United States and the North providing for a temporary
moratorium on long-range missile tests. The United States, in turn, has
agreed to lift the Trading with the Enemy Act, economic sanctions that
have been in place since 1950. In addition, the U.S. is expecting the
first-ever visit of a senior North Korean official to Washington in early
2000. Given the recent flurry of events and the approaching end of the
Clinton Administration, it is a good time to assess the past five years,
to look at where that relationship stands now and to think about where it
may be heading in the future.

1. The Past

When evaluated objectively, the 1994 Agreed Framework still appears to
have been a good deal for the United States. First and foremost, the
agreement dealt with what was almost certainly the imminent threat of an
active, substantial North Korean nuclear weapons program that could have
begun production of such weapons within a few years and resulted in a
large stockpile by the end of the century. Critics of the agreement seem
to forget that the D PRK might already have produced enough plutonium for
up to two weapons and had sufficient plutonium in irradiated fuel to
build up to five additional weapons. Add to that the plutonium likely to
come from two new reactors under construction and, by the end of the
century, the North stockpile might have grown at a rate of 10-12 weapons
per year. In short, North Korea could have become an overt nuclear power
on par with Israel if not larger.

Such a development by itself would have been very disturbing. National
Security Review 28, completed by the Bush Administration in spring 1991,
summarized the reasons why a nuclear North Korea would have posed grave
difficulties for the United States, Japan and South Korea. Nuclear
weapons in the hands of the North could; 1) pose a direct threat to U.S.
forces in the ROK, Japan and the surrounding seas; 2) be used to threaten
the ROK and Japan; 3) lead the ROK to develop nuclear weapons on its own,
potentially disrupting the U.S.-ROK security relationship, bilateral
cooperation in nuclear energy and regional relationships; 4)
significantly alter Japan's security perceptions, possibly to the
detriment of regional stability and U.S.-Japan relations; 5) prompt the
ROK to conduct a pre-emptive strike on DPRK nuclear facilities, which
could engage U.S. forces and involve them in any DPRK counterattack; 6)
be sold abroad; and 7) embolden the North to use its conventional
military capability against the South. All of these concerns were just
as valid three years later when the Agreed Framework was concluded.

Superimposing a nuclear North Korea on the internal political and
economic situation that has developed in that country since 1994 would
have created an even more frightening situation. Food shortages and
large-scale starvation became widespread beginning in 1995. The economic
downturn, which had begun well before the signing of the Agreed
Framework, accelerated. The death of Kim Il-Sung in summer 1994 and the
slow motion succession of Kim Jong-Il created the perception that the
North's political stability was hanging by a thread. Perceptions that
the North was about to collapse gained widespread acceptance, not just in
the West. Following the death of Kim Il-Sung in July 1994, there was a
definite perception in South Korea that the North would not last long.
During the closing stages of negotiations which led to the Agreed
Framework and the reactor supply contract in 1995, President Kim Young-
Sam repeatedly urged the U.S. to bide its time since the North would
collapse soon.

The agreement did have shortcomings. The U.S. publicly acknowledged that
it did not deal with facilities other than those associated with the
known core elements of the North's nuclear infrastructure. Limitations
on research and development or provisions for "anywhere, anytime"
inspections of suspect nuclear sites seemed to be unachievable at the
time. The agreement did provide for an eventual extensive IAEA
examination of the North's nuclear program, which would take care of
these concerns. Nevertheless, these "shortcomings" are still the focus
of criticism in the United States. For example, the recent Republican
"North Korea Advisory Group" report to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives states there is "significant evidence" that over the past
five years" undeclared nuclear weapons development activity continued,
including efforts to acquire uranium enrichment technologies and recent
high-explosive tests." This assessment may be correct but the key
question remains does the North have a covert program which has produced
or is producing nuclear weapons.

On this issue, the jury is still out. While North Korean defectors are
notoriously unreliable, many have talked about an active, covert program.
On the other hand, Kim Kil-son, who worked for the official in charge of
the North's munitions industry, has stated that the DPRK is maintaining
the option of building nuclear weapons but probably has not produced
them. The fact is that, contrary to the impression given by the Advisory
Group report, there is no significant evidence of a parallel covert
nuclear program on anything approaching the scale of the overt frozen
program. The recent experience with the suspected nuclear site at
Kumchang-ni--which U.S. inspectors found to be nuclear-free in spite of
intelligence reports leaked to the press--is a cautionary tale which
critics should take into consideration when making claims about the
North's nuclear program.

There has been significantly less progress in implementing the other
sections of the framework. Contrary to the terms of the agreement,
diplomatic liaison offices have not been established in each country,
largely because the North, after a great deal of initial progress, has
seemed uninterested. While the agreement specifies that further
improvements in bilateral political and economic relations will occur as
other "issues of concern" to the U.S. are addressed, there has also been
little progress on this front until recently. (In this context, while
the agreement is not specific, it was clearly emphasized to the North
both during senior-level meetings leading to the Agreed Framework and
throughout 1995 that the most important issue of concern to the United
States was its ballistic missile program.) The one exception to this
rather dismal picture has been U.S.-DPRK discussions on locating and
returning the remains of American soldiers missing in action during the
Korean War. For the most part, these discussions-because of their
humanitarian nature-have been insulated from the broader ups and downs of
the bilateral relationship.

The same is true for provisions in the Agreed Framework dealing with
South-North relations which specify that the North should take steps to
implement the South-North Denuclearization declaration and to reengage
the South in bilateral dialogue. The North has shown no interest in
moving forward with negotiating the inspection regime necessary to
implement the South-North accord. Indeed, all mention of the agreement
seems to have dropped out of the diplomatic discourse with the North. On
South-North dialogue, if the barometer of success is government-to-
government contacts, then the record is abysmal. But if the barometer
includes business and non-governmental activities, then the record is not
so bad, particularly given the dramatic expansion of such contacts since
the Kim Dae-Jung Administration took office in 1998. The fact remains
that the North under Kim Jong-Il considers government-to-government
contacts to be a political "third rail" although it has seemed quite
willing for some time to reap whatever economic benefits it can get from
the South.

The failures of the last five years have less to do with the Agreed
Framework and more to do with poor implementation. It is worth noting
that those problems do not just include the difficulties of moving
forward with "other issues" and South-North dialogue. As is well known,
they also cover key components of the Framework including: 1) the slow
pace of getting the KEDO reactor project off the ground; 2) haphazard
deliveries of heavy fuel oil to the North promised by the Agreed
Framework and; 3) the lack of progress in preparing for the International
Atomic Energy Agency's eventual examination of the North's nuclear past
in an effort to determine once and for all whether the North has a
weapons program.

Less well documented are the reasons for these problems. There has been
speculation that the U.S. government has deliberately implemented the
agreement slowly on the assumption that the DPRK would collapse soon.
Immediately after the agreement was completed, press reports cited
Administration sources who argued the U.S. would never have to follow
through with its commitments. Those reports became more frequent in
1995-1996 as the North's situation worsened and U.S. officials predicted
that Pyongyang might not last much longer. More recently, one key
official has hinted publicly at a linkage between the North's weakness
and U.S. policy. In 1997, shortly before taking office, Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Stanley Roth told a
Senate committee: "from a Machiavellian perspective, buying time is in
our national interest."

However, reality has little to do with the perception. The reality is
that poor implementation over the past five years has less to do with
some Machiavellian plot and more to do with other, more mundane problems.

* Lack of leadership by the Clinton Administration: As the nuclear crisis
receded and senior-level decision-makers moved on to other business,
implementation sank back into the bureaucracy. As a result, the
Administration has had trouble sustaining momentum, particularly in the
face of problems with Congress, the ROK and the North. But the U.S. also
suffered from "mission creep" and had trouble keeping focused on
implementation. In April 1996, the U.S. and ROK put a new major proposal
for Four Party Peace Talks on the table. Unlike previous formulas for
peace talks, which came and went with great frequency, this proposal
became the overwhelming focus of U.S. policy to the detriment of
implementation of the Agreed Framework and particularly efforts to stem
the DPRK's missile program.

* Fear of Congress: Even before the Republicans won the 1994 legislative
elections, the Administration was hesitant to commit significant
resources to implementation given the controversy surrounding the Agreed
Framework. The results of that election only made the Administration
more cautious. While Congress has provided most of the funding that has
been requested, those requests have fallen short of what was actually
needed. A case in point: the Administration has not asked for even token
funding for the KEDO reactor project since its first request was rejected
in 1995. The Hill's refusal to provide even token amounts for the
project--and the Administration's unwillingness to push for funding--has
weakened the U.S. ability to lead in implementation of that project and
in engaging the North.

* Difficulties in dealing with North Korea: Under the best of
circumstances, the North is difficult to deal with and any expectations
to the contrary were misplaced. The North has continued to pursue
measures seen as necessary to insure its national security, measures that
have resulted in incidents such as the 1996 submarine incursion into ROK
territory. That incident had major political consequences, setting back
implementation at a time when momentum was starting to build. Moreover,
the North became increasingly distracted by its own internal economic
problems, focusing on securing the next food shipment rather than on
moving forward on its broader strategic agenda of engagement. Finally, a
great deal of confusion was created in Pyongyang by the new Four Party
proposal and the subsequent U.S. emphasis on that proposal, confusion
that resulted in much wheel-spinning and delay.

* Difficulties in dealing with South Korea: In the aftermath of the
Agreed Framework, the Kim Young-Sam Administration did everything
possible to stymie U.S. initiatives to move forward, particularly in
improving political and economic relations. This may have been a
backlash against what was perceived by many in the ROK as an unjust
agreement that stuck it with a large bill for two light-water reactors.
Nevertheless, it was a bill the Kim Young Sam Administration insisted on
paying in order to have a large say in the project. Having initially
encouraged the U.S. to engage the North after it withdrew from the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1993 and then pushed it to put
forward a comprehensive settlement with the DPRK, including improved
political and economic ties, by 1995 the Kim Administration's growing
insecurity led it to oppose any engagement without an improvement in
South-North ties.

As a result, by 1998 implementation continued slowly, but the U.S. effort
resembled a fragmented process rather than a policy designed to achieve
specific results.

2. The Present

During the past year, U.S.-North Korean relations and those between the
North and the rest of the international community seem to have bottomed
out. 1998 was a particularly bad year with the public disclosure of a
suspected underground nuclear site in the North followed closely by the
August long-range missile test. For the moment, that trend has been
reversed. The U.S. team which visited Kumchang-ri in May 1999 found no
evidence that the site was being used to house a nuclear reactor,
reprocessing plant or any other nuclear-related facility. Former Defense
Secretary William Perry's review of U.S. policy and his visit to
Pyongyang in spring 1999 helped prompt an agreement in Berlin on a
temporary flight test moratorium for long-range North Korean missiles.
The U.S. also announced that it would lift the Trading with the Enemy Act
sanctions that had been in place since 1950. Moreover, as a result of
the Berlin agreement and subsequent discussions, a senior-level DPRK
official will visit Washington soon. Finally, Japanese-DPRK
normalization talks have resumed, the result of a visit to Pyongyang by
former Japanese Prime Minister Muriyama late last year.

In particular, the Perry review has played a critical role in
reinvigorating the Clinton Administration's engagement policy.

* It has served as a valuable "mid-course correction." The review
reaffirmed the main objectives in U.S. policy-makers minds at the time
the Agreed Framework was signed; controlling the North's nuclear and
missile programs in the context of improving political and economic
relationships between the North and the United States, South Korea and
Japan. That focus was lost once the U.S. shifted its emphasis to the
Four Party Talks in April 1996.

* It reemphasized a theme that has been implicit in U.S. policy since
the Bush Administration, namely, if the North did not move down the path
of engagement, the other path in U.S.-North Korea relations could entail
unspecified measures to bolster deterrence.

* The review restored trilateral cooperation between the U.S., the
Republic of Korea and Japan which had been very close up until 1995 but
then seemed to deteriorate, in part because the new focus on the Four
Party talks left Japan out of the main arena of engagement.

* Finally, the review restored a high-level focus on North Korea policy
that had been lacking since 1996 when Ambassador Robert L. Gallucci, the
negotiator of the Agreed Framework, left the U.S. government. Because of
that focus, the Perry review provided the Administration with the
wherewithal to lifting economic sanctions as part of an effort to improve
bilateral relations.

While the Perry process has not restored bipartisan support for the
Administration's policy, no review could have achieved that objective in
an election year short of a total change in policy. It is ironic that
the string of positive events in 1999, set in motion in part by a review
mandated by congressional critics, has taken the wind out of the Hill's
sails. Nevertheless, the Clinton Administration's approach in dealing
with "rogue states," including North Korea, Iraq and Iran, has already
been the subject of attack by one Republican candidate, Senator John
McCain.

As for Pyongyang, it has been cautiously receptive to the Perry process.
There may be many reasons for that receptivity but, above all else, the
North is motivated by regime survival. That objective may be served by
maintaining the option to deploy long-range missiles and nuclear weapons.
However, for now, it is not served by moving forward with testing or
deployment. This is especially true given the North's continued economic
and food problems which, in spite of recent improvements, still have to
be a source of concern for its leadership. Maintaining engagement with
the United States is still more attractive since it opens the gates for
receiving economic benefits from South Korea, maybe Japan and certainly
China which is loathe to see a return to an era of confrontation between
the DPRK and the outside world. Moreover, the North can not totally
ignore the potential security ramifications of its own actions. For
example, the August 1998 missile test has helped accelerate trends in
Japan towards a more assertive defense posture that the North must view
with concern.

In that context, Pyongyang also has to have some concerns about a
possible change in U.S. Administrations come January 2001. Locking in
progress during this Administration, such as the lifting of the Trading
with the Enemy Act sanctions, and seeking some equilibrium in its
relations with the ROK and Japan would seem to be a perfectly prudent
approach in the face of uncertainty about the future.

3. The Near Future

Will the Perry Review give U.S. policy enough momentum to move forward
this year? The visit to Washington of a senior-level DPRK official will
certainly provide the Administration with an important opportunity. The
Administration's objectives for such a visit are likely to be twofold.
First, it would like to reinvigorate efforts to control the North's
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. That probably
means seeking more definitive language committing the North to a missile
test moratorium, the resumption of talks on limiting the North's
ballistic missile program and establishing another negotiation designed,
in the words of the Perry report, to provide "verifiable assurances that
North Korea is nuclear free." Second, the two sides are likely to
establish a process designed to improve political and economic ties. It
might address anything from further senior-level contacts, to increased
food aid, to removing North Korea from Washington's list of countries
that sponsor terrorism. The North is more interested in the latter set
of discussions, which are also important from Washington's perspective
since an improvement in overall relations is necessary to help make
progress on issues that concern it the most.

However, the Administration's ability to move forward over the next year
may be limited. Achieving progress on Washington's main agenda- limiting
the North's missile and nuclear programs- will be difficult since the
issues are technically and diplomatically complicated. On the other
hand, achieving progress on some issues of concern to Pyongyang--such as
improving political relations or securing increased food aid--might not
be as complicated. But pushing forward without progress on both tracks
could leave the Administration exposed to partisan attacks in a
presidential election year. That reality will almost certainly inject a
note of caution into the Clinton Administration's approach.

The North may also not be in a rush to move forward. Discussions on
setting up the senior-level meeting have moved at a slower pace than
anticipated, a pace that reflects Pyongyang's own unknowable internal
priorities and dynamics. Many factors may come into play including
inherent distrust, the lack of clear benefits for the North if it signs
up to the Perry process and a decision-making process that has to
accommodate some players who are less enthusiastic than others about
engagement. The North's caution may also reflect a view that the
political situation in the U.S. is not ripe for sustainable progress
beyond the upcoming senior-level meeting. Indeed, some North Koreans may
hope that a new Republican Administration could deliver such progress a
la Nixon and China. In any case, if historical experience is any guide,
the North is capable of moving forward quickly but usually only after a
period, sometimes prolonged, of sparring. That dynamic will not work
well with an Administration entering its last year in office.

Even if U.S.-DPRK relations make little near-term progress, the situation
in the region could achieve some temporary equilibrium in 2000. An
"October surprise" by the North--such as a missile test--can not be
totally discounted but its policy now seems to be on a different course.
The DPRK-Japan normalization talks, just underway, will be an important
bell-weather. Continuing discussions will serve as an important brake on
any further mischief. But if those talks were to break down, as they
have in the past over the complicated issue of kidnapped Japanese
nationals, that might signal tough times ahead. As for the South-North
relationship, the continuing growth of economic and social ties is likely
to exert some constraints on Pyongyang. Moreover, after clearing the
hurdle of the upcoming elections, President Kim Dae-Jung may exert every
effort to secure government-to-government contacts. There is evidently
some thinking in Pyongyang that after the election, Kim-- like President
No Tae-u before him--may be even more anxious to make progress as he
approaches "lame duck" status. It is unclear how Pyongyang would respond
but it will probably want to cautiously explore this possibility.

The thought of equilibrium may seem comforting. But, if there is one
lesson to be learned from the past, it is that equilibrium on the
peninsula may be hard to sustain, particularly in the face of the
inevitable unexpected event. That may take the form of incursions like
the 1996 submarine incident, the 1999 clashes in the Yellow Sea or
something even more serious, like the death of Kim Il-Sung in 1994.

4. Beyond the Clinton Administration

While a victory by either Democrat is unlikely to result in any policy
changes, a Republican Administration may be a different story. Based on
past statements by key advisors, a Bush Administration is not likely to
change the overall policy approach, although it may differ on tactics and
some substance. For example, in a February 1995 Washington Post article,
former Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, now a close Bush
advisor, argued that the Agreed Framework's major flaw was its failure to
achieve "a reduction in the North Korean threat to South Korea or
significant progress in North-South relations." He stated that "special
inspections must be accelerated" rather than waiting for the completion
of a significant portion of the reactor project as specified in the
Agreed Framework. Wolfowitz also argued that heavy fuel oil couldn't be
provided indefinitely without "reducing the military threat, particularly
the massive offensive development of North Korean forces."

In 1999, Ambassador Richard Armitage, a former Assistant Secretary of
Defense and also a Bush Advisor, led a "Team B" review of U.S. policy.
The review supported engagement although it was critical of the substance
and tactics of the Clinton Administration's approach. The Armitage
report argues for strengthening deterrence to support a more activist
U.S. diplomatic effort. That effort would include, among other measures,
a six party conference (United States, Japan, South Korea, North Korea,
Russia and China) which would make it clear that all participants are
prepared to coexist with the North. The review also argued that, while
the U.S. should honor existing commitments such as the 1994 agreement, it
should seek some modifications, particularly the early shipment of spent
nuclear fuel out of the North.

A McCain Administration's policy may be even more different than the
Clinton approach. Throughout 1994, Senator McCain asserted that any
sanctions against the North should be backed by the explicit threat of
air strikes against North Korea's nuclear reprocessing facilities.
During President Carter's trip to Pyongyang in June 1994, Senator McCain
stated that "we wait and wait and wait endlessly for the administration
to recognize the manifest failures of its diplomacy and cease its
mindless devotion to the principle if at first we fail to appease, try,
try again." In 1998, after the North's long-range missile test, McCain
argued that the U.S. should cut off all funding to KEDO. In 1999, after
the U.S. and DPRK reached agreement on access to the suspected nuclear
site at Kumchang-ri, Senator McCain stated "I fear that it may be the
beginning of a pattern of material concessions by the U.S. in exchange
for vaguely worded commitments that the North Koreans have no intention
of keeping."

In any case, a new Administration is likely to face significant
constraints on its ability to change the current approach towards North
Korea. One little noticed result of the Perry review is that, by
restoring trilateral consensus on North Korea policy, it may tie the
hands of the next Administration. While the U.S. government may change,
there are unlikely to be any significant political changes in South Korea
or Japan, both of whom played an active role in shaping the Perry
approach. Moreover, maintaining trilateral consensus will be critical
for Democrats as well as Republicans, not just to ensure the proper
backing for U.S. diplomatic efforts towards the North, but also in
helping Washington to ensure that neither of its allies pursues a too
independent approach. In short, Washington may have some leeway to
change the current policy but not much without stressing its critical
relationships with Seoul and Tokyo.

If the new U.S. Administration decides to continue down the current path,
it will face three key challenges.

* Implementation of the Agreed Framework: A new Administration may try to
accelerate implementation of the Agreed Framework's nuclear provisions.
But even without acceleration, it will have to prepare for the IAEA's
examination of the North's nuclear past, the issue that provoked the
original crisis in 1993. That examination, which could begin in 2004, is
likely to be both politically and technically stressful for the U.S., its
regional allies and the IAEA. It will touch upon core strategic
interests for all concerned including the integrity of the Agreed
Framework and the international non-proliferation regime, the future of
U.S. relations with South Korea, North Korea and Japan, and the future
security environment in Northeast Asia. A new Administration will have
to carefully prepare prior to the beginning of the examination to ensure
success, a difficult task since little or nothing has been done since
1994. While the nuclear freeze also preserved important information,
there has been virtually no progress in preserving additional information
essential to the conduct of the examination, a result of North Korea's
stonewalling continual IAEA requests.

* Pursuit of limits on missiles: Whatever happens as a result of the
senior-level DPRK official's visit to Washington, the North is unlikely
to agree to a test moratorium of unlimited duration and may, at some
point, threaten to restart its test program. While it is conceptually
easy to devise a staged program of measures to control the North's
missile program, the key issue will be whether a new Administration is
willing to "buy out" the North's missile program. That concept remains
politically incorrect, but the North is unlikely to give up a program it
views as "legitimate" for nothing. The price remains unclear but
Pyongyang has dropped hints in the past that the program may be up for
grabs for cash from any country willing to pay or linked to a new "peace
agreement" on the Peninsula. It will be interesting to see how far a new
Republican Administration would be willing to go to stop the DPRK's
missile program through diplomatic measures, particularly since ending
that program would undercut arguments for a strong national missile
defense program. All of this will have to be done in the context of a
growing South Korean effort to build longer-range missiles and space
launch vehicles, a development which will almost certainly complicate
U.S. efforts.

* The future of the U.S. security policy on the peninsula: This may prove
to be "a bridge to far" for any new Administration but it remains the
critical issue in determining success or failure if the current U.S.
approach continues. Can a policy of engagement be successful without
adjustments in the U.S. security posture on the Peninsula? The answer is
probably no because the changes the U.S. seeks in North Korea's security
posture--its foregoing weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles
and ultimately reductions in its conventional forces--are only possible
if accompanied by changes in the U.S. posture on the peninsula.
Moreover, recent rumblings from the South indicate strong public support
for reducing the U.S. troop presence. All of these developments point
towards the need for serious consideration of a transition away from the
1953 armistice agreement to a more permanent peace arrangement as well as
away from current U.S. troops levels. A key question for a new
Administration will be the ultimate objective of that transition and, on
a broader level, its implications for U.S. relations with the Republic of
Korea and the rest of the region.

III. Nautilus Invites Your Responses

The Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network invites your
responses either to these comments or to the original essay.
Please send responses to:
napsnet@nautilus.org (preferably using "response to forum #00-02"
as the subject). Responses will be considered for redistribution
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