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SPECIAL REPORT-아시아에 대한 부시행정부 정책

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2001-04-02 00:08
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NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK
***** SPECIAL REPORT *****


***** NAUTILUS POLICY FORUM ONLINE (#01-02) *****
US POLICY TOWARD ASIA UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION

"Six Myths About Dealing With Pyongyang"
By Leon V. Sigal
February 20, 2001

The NAPSNet contributions to the Nautilus Policy Forum Online are
intended to provide expert analysis of contemporary peace and
security issues in Northeast Asia, and an opportunity to
participate in discussion of the analysis. The Forum is open to
all participants of the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network
(NAPSNet).

A world wide web version of this report can be found at:
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0102C_Sigal.html

As always, Nautilus invites your responses to this report.
Please see "Nautilus Invites Your Responses," below, and send
your responses to the NAPSNet Coordinator at:
NAPSNet@nautilus.org.

Copyright (c) 2001 Nautilus of America / The Nautilus Institute

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Contents:
I. Introduction
II. Essay by Leon V. Sigal
III. Nautilus Invites Your Responses

I. Introduction

This essay is by Leon V. Sigal, Director of the Northeast Asia
Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council and
author of "Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea."
This is the third in a series on the future of US relations with
Northeast Asian countries under the administration of incoming US
President George W. Bush.

Sigal argues that the proposed US missile defense system is too far off
to protect the United States from a possible DPRK missile attack, and,
therefore, it is in the US interest to conclude a deal to terminate the
DPRK's missile program. Sigal outlines six myths, which he argues have
prevented the conclusion of such a missile deal.

II. Essay by Leon V. Sigal

"Six Myths About Dealing With Pyongyang"

A deal to shut down North Korea's missile program would greatly benefit
U.S. security because it will take at least six years to deploy any
defenses to protect against the launch of a North Korea missile while a
verifiable end to Pyongyang's missile threat can be concluded in just
months. Critics who decry such a deal are perpetuating six myths that
have impeded negotiations with Pyongyang.

Myth one is that Washington is yielding to blackmail in dealing with
Pyongyang. North Korea's threats have been widely misconstrued. For the
past decade, Pyongyang has been playing tit-for-tat, not blackmail. It
has cooperated when Washington cooperated and retaliated when Washington
reneged. Experience taught the previous administration what the critics
have yet to learn -- that reciprocity works in bargaining with
Pyongyang.

Myth two is that the United States is giving North Korea what it wants
without getting anything in return. In fact, the October 1994 Agreed
Framework shut down North Korean nuclear plants that could have
generated enough plutonium to make at least 60 nuclear warheads by now.
In talks last October with Secretary of State Albright in Pyongyang,
North Korea's Kim Jong Il offered not only to halt all missile exports,
but also to freeze all testing, production, and deployment of his No-
Dong and Taepo-Dong missiles and eventually eliminate them. He has also
expressed readiness for talks to reduce his artillery, tanks, and
troops. Those talks can defuse the armed standoff in Korea that nearly
led to war in June 1994. Pyongyang wants to put its troops to more
productive use in the civilian economy, but can do so only if Seoul and
Washington reciprocate. Talks cannot begin in earnest until the allies
work out a common negotiating position.

Myth three is that Pyongyang's aim in these talks is to get all U.S.
troops out of Korea. Yet Pyongyang has been telling Washington since
1992 that so long as the United States remains its enemy, U.S. troops
are a threat and must go, but once the relationship is no longer
hostile, U.S. troops in Korea could remain in a new role, that of
peacekeepers, while still allied with the South. That would provide a
rationale for continued U.S. presence, now that deterrence against the
threat of invasion is no longer as politically compelling to many South
Koreans.

Myth four is that Pyongyang's emergence from self-imposed isolation this
year was sudden change of heart -- a death-bed conversion. In fact,
North Korea has tried to reach out to the United States, South Korea,
and Japan since the late 1980s -- well before its economic decline and
famine -- in hopes of ending its lifelong enmity with all three.
Suspicious of Pyongyang's intent and determined to keep it isolated in
hopes of compelling it to stop nuclear-arming, Washington initially
impeded Seoul and Tokyo from improving ties. It also discouraged Israel,
Italy, and others from normalizing diplomatic relations.

Myth five is that until Pyongyang reforms its economy, aiding it would
be wasteful. Yet aid is the price for achieving U.S. security goals and
a tool for changing North Korea. Sure, the North's economy is so
depressed that any aid or investment would help it revive, reform or no
reform, but outside assistance will also bring potential agents of
change into North Korea, so long as they play by its rules. Washington
will get nowhere by insisting that Pyongyang first open up or pass Econ
101.

Myth six is that Pyongyang is desperately trying to extort money to
forestall economic collapse. In return for giving up missile exports,
tests, production, and deployment, Pyongyang does seek compensation in
the form of aid and investment from the outside, including having
another country launch its satellites. Its primary concern, however, is
its security. It sees an end to enmity with Washington as the only way
to ensure that. That is why it wanted President Clinton to come to
Pyongyang and why President Bush should go when a missile deal is ready
for signing.

III. Nautilus Invites Your Responses

The Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network invites your Responses.
Please send responses to: napsnet@nautilus.org (preferably using
"response to forum #01-02" as the subject). Responses will be considered
for redistribution to the network only if they include the author's
name,
affiliation, and explicit consent.

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