NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK
***** SPECIAL REPORT *****

The following "DPRK Report" is the product of a joint project between the
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of
International Studies (Monterey, California, USA) and the Center for
Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (Moscow, Russia). It is
written by Russian analysts associated with the ICIP and edited by the
CNS.

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THE DPRK REPORT, No. 22 (January-February 2000)


1. North Korean Views of the U.S. National Missile Defense Program

According to various sources, the North Korean leadership is totally
preoccupied with the issue of the DPRK's national security. Pyongyang
explains to foreign dignitaries that the only reason it is participating
in the four-party talks is "to gain the withdrawal of American troops
from the Korean Peninsula and to thwart Washington's plans to deploy
national missile defenses." "Actually," North Korean officials stress,
"the PRC's and Seoul's participation in the four-party talks have no real
meaning. This [only] is a concession to American demands." They
emphasize that "Unless American troops leave the Korean Peninsula for
good, no discussions on any other subject make sense."

North Koreans are even less interested in widening the scope of the talks
to include Russia and Japan. The DPRK suggests that instead of
advocating six-party talks, Russia "should concentrate on demanding the
withdrawal of the American military from South Korea and on disrupting
U.S. schemes for NMD."

Pyongyang points out that NMD "though publicly directed against the DPRK,
in fact is meant to achieve total superiority over Russia and China, thus
making Washington's domination of the entire world a reality."

The DPRK vehemently denies accusations that it ever attempted to develop
nuclear and long-range missile capabilities. Instead, North Korea
officials say that their country has only one aim: to launch peaceful
satellites "like any other developed and accomplished nation of the
world." They argue that Washington "lies about DPRK nuclear and missile
plans with only one purpose-to gain internal and external support for NMD
and its other aggressive military plans."

2. North Korean Views of Japanese Plans to Develop TMD

>From the North Korean point of view, if Japan develops TMD "it will
greatly enhance the threat to the DPRK's national security and the danger
of a major war in the Far East." DPRK officials, however, tend to think
that in order to block TMD plans in the region "it is necessary to put
pressure not so much on Tokyo as on Washington." As an influential North
Korean scholar said privately: "The decisions are made in the USA. If we
can convince the Americans, through a combination of strong and soft
actions and statements, not to embark on the dangerous road of a new
round of the arms race, then the Japanese will follow the cue from
overseas. If not, then Tokyo will succumb to American pressure."

Pyongyang, it seems, prefers to concentrate its current efforts not so
much on denunciations of Tokyo as on a policy of accommodation. A high-
ranking North Korean diplomat argues that "If we succeed in normalizing
diplomatic relations with Japan, the DPRK will obtain reliable access to
food aid, technology, investment, and other items of great importance for
our country." The diplomat adds that Japan is considered in the North as
"potentially our most important economic partner in the long run."
Rapprochement with Tokyo is also seen in Pyongyang as a method of
influencing American policies in Korea and the Far East as a whole,
including U.S. plans for NMD and TMD.

3. The New Phase in Russian-North Korean Relations

Any analysis of current North Korean publications and the statements of
various officials leads to the clear conclusion that Pyongyang is not
happy with the new, lower status of its relations with Russia. The DPRK
evidently feels that it has been "betrayed and damaged in a material
sense" by its former mentor. Some officials hint that the present dismal
economic situation in the country was caused by the "abrupt cessation of
Soviet (Russian) aid and the withdrawal of its military shield." Left
alone, North Korea "had no other choice but to pour all our scarce
resources into military programs, especially because Americans and their
South Korean puppets used the opportunity to immediately increase
pressure on the DPRK." North Korea wants Russia to compensate it for
this "damage," at least partially, by repairing and modernizing all those
enterprises built in North Korea by the Soviet Union during the prior
period of relations.

Until and unless this compensation is provided, Pyongyang says that it
will not consider itself to be bound by any obligations to Russia.
Moreover, North Korea says that will remain absolutely indifferent to
Russian initiatives concerning security arrangements in Northeast Asia,
as well as Moscow's attempts to contribute to peace and stability in the
sub-region and in the Asian-Pacific as a whole.

The only issue on which North Korea demonstrates its sympathy with the
Russian authorities is Chechnya. Officials state that Moscow has every
right to fight separatists and terrorists to restore order and unity in
the country. Interpreting events in Chechnya, North Korean
representatives blame Americans and other "imperialist forces" for
"stirring up troubles in hopes of driving Russia out of oil-rich
regions."

4. Izvestiya Report on Alleged Russian Influence over Pyongyang's Missile
Tests

On February 17, 2000, the Moscow-based newspaper Izvestiya reported that
the DPRK was planning to conduct a Taepodong missile test to celebrate
Kim Jong-il's birthday on February 16. [Ed. note: See "Alleged DPRK-RF
Missile Agreement" in the Russian Section of the Daily Report for
February 22: http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/0002/FEB22.html#item22].
The report stated that North Korean officials were dissuaded from doing
so by visiting Russian diplomats. On the basis of available information,
however, this report-as well as the entire Izvestiya article, written by
Yury Glotyuk-appears to be groundless. There is no evidence that the
DPRK had any real plans to launch a Taepodong on February 16,
consequently, the role of Russian officials appears to have been
overstated.

5. North Korean Views on the Russian Presidential Elections

Not surprisingly, North Korea's favorite candidate in the forthcoming
March 26, 2000 presidential elections in Russia is communist Gennady
Zyuganov. As DPRK representatives point out, Zyuganov, if he comes to
power, "will certainly restore an anti-imperialist stand on crucial
issues." They believe that he would fight against U.S. national missile
defense plans, NATO expansion, NATO attempts to ignore the United Nations
and to use force against independent states, and "other tricks."

In regards to the Korean Peninsula, North Korean officials believe that
Mr. Zyuganov "will firmly support the just struggle of the Korean nation
against the occupation of the South by American neo-colonialist troops
and will provide adequate aid to the DPRK."

As for Acting President Vladimir Putin, North Korean officials express
doubts about him, describing him as "controversial."

On the one hand, they say that Mr. Putin shows signs of "standing firmly
against the West and its agents in Chechnya and elsewhere." Mr. Putin is
praised for recognizing "the necessity of keeping [Russia's] armed forces
strong in the face of encroachments by Washington and the need to bring
order and discipline to Russian society."

On the other hand, the leading candidate for the Russian presidency is
distrusted by Pyongyang because he "comes from the pro-Western, liberal-
democratic Yeltsin camp," he "continues to seek money and friendship in
the West," and he "praises the private economy and the bourgeois press."

North Koreans, however, preserve a certain hope that "tough realities and
the patriotic figures in Putin's entourage will leave him with no choice
but to move to an anti-Western stand and to look for reliable friends
like the DPRK."